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Chapter 7
THE READINESS OF THE PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION FOR EUROPEAN
UNION ACCESSION
Ana-Maria Boromisa
Croatian Energy Regulation Council (VRED)*
Zagreb
ABSTRACT
Institution building is crucial for successful integration into the
European Union (EU). Through the Stabilization and Association
Agreement (SAA), Croatia bound itself to strengthen institutions at all
levels in the area of the administration, priority areas being protection
of competition and state aid.
According to the demands that the EU has made on the public
administrations of the accession countries in the pre-accession period,
we shall identify the criteria for membership. We shall define the level
of the fulfilment of conditions for membership and the measures that
should be carried out during the process of the reform in Croatia by a
comparative analysis of the state of affairs in Croatia, the candidates
and the EU members. The main conclusion is that institutional weak-
ness in Croatia is the outcome of failure to define the priorities and the
timetable for the implementation of given reforms.
Key words:
public administration, market competition, institutional criteria for
membership, single market, European Union, Croatia, candidates
* The views expressed herein are the standpoint of the author, are not binding upon the
institution in which she works, and do not necessarily coincide with the official views of
the Croatian Energy Regulatory Council (VRED).
INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to analyse the role of the public ad-
ministration in meeting the economic criteria for membership in the EU.
The concept of public administration in this work refers to the institutions
necessary for the enforcement of the rules, the focus being on institutions
that are charged with positive action at the national level (Table 1).i
Table 1 The Public Administration in Croatia*
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State administration Other bodies
Ministries State administration 
organisations
Offices of the
Government 
Legal entities with
public authorities*
- foreign affairs
- interior
- defence
- European integration
- finance
- economy
- Croatian homeland war
veterans 
- public works, reconstruc-
tion and construction
- culture
- trades, SMEs
- agriculture and forestry
- maritime affairs, tran-
sport and communica-
tions
- justice, administration
and local self-government
- environmental protection,
urban development and
construction 
- education and sports
- labour and social welfare
- tourism
- health
- science and technology
State Geodetic Directorate
State Directorate for Water 
Management State Weat-
her 
Bureau State Institute for
the protection of family,
maternity and youth
State intellectual property
office
State bureau of standards
and metrology
Central Bureau of Stati-
stics
State Inspector’s Office
- for internal supervision
- for Internetisation
- for state property
- for national minorities
- for public relations
- for social partnership
- for development strategy
- for legislation
- for cooperation with
NGOs
- for prevention of drug
abuse 
- for cooperation with the
ICTY
- for cooperation with in-
ternational institutions
- for detainees and missing
persons
- of the Government’s
agent at the European
Court of Human Rights
in Strasbourg
Agency for the protection
of market competition
Securities Commission
Agency for Supervision of
Pension Funds and Insu-
rance Companies
(HAGENA)
State Agency for Deposit
Insurance and Bank reha-
bilitation 
Directorate for supervision
of insurance companies
(DINADOS)
Central Register of Insured
Persons (REGOS)
Telecommunications Co-
uncil**
Radio and TV Council**
Croatian Energy Regula-
tory Council
* The Table shows the public administration that is the subject of this paper. It does not
include offices of the state administration at the local level (county offices of the state ad-
ministration or local self-government). Not all the bodies with public authorities are
shown in the table, only those that have regulatory authorities according to OECD crite-
ria (OECD, 2003). The government categorises the public sector differently. See
www.vlada.hr.
** According to the new Telecommunications Law (NN 122/03), the authorities of the Te-
lecommunications and Radio and Television councils should be assumed by the Croatian
Telecommunications Agency.
At the outset we shall present the conditions for membership and
analyse the role of the public administration in the attainment of them.
In accordance with the criteria for membership and the role of the pu-
blic administration in attaining them, in the second part we shall iden-
tify elements capable of being used to evaluate the ability of the public
administration to fulfil the membership criteria. In the third part, on the
basis of elements thus identified, we shall evaluate the level to which
the public administration in Croatia meets the membership criteria, and
to the extent possible make comparisons with the candidates and with
the members. The fourth part is focused on the points of vulnerability
of Croatia, and will help conclusions and recommendations to be made
at the end of the paper.
THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION IN SATISFYING
EUROPEAN UNION CRITERIA 
According to the Founding Treatyii (Articles 6 and 49), any Eu-
ropean state that respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law may
apply to become a Member of the Union. A candidate has to meet ot-
her criteria too, as defined by the European Council in Copenhagen in
1993. Usually political, economic and legal criteria are stated, although
the candidates are also required to accept the objectives of economic
and monetary union. The fifth criterion for membership is the ability of
the EU to accept new members. The Copenhagen criteria were additio-
nally explained at a meeting of the European Council in Madrid in
1995, when, inter alia, the institutional criterion was also expressly laid
down (Table 2).
The institutional requirement is implicit in the Copenhagen cri-
teria: the political criterion (stability of institutions guaranteeing demo-
cracy, and the rule of law) and the acquis criterion (implementation of
Union legislation) together imply the institutional criterion, i.e., the ef-
fective implementation of rules harmonised with the EU. At the same
time, an evaluation of the ability of the EU to accept new members is
based on the capacity of EU institutions to take in the representatives of
the new members without the effectiveness of decision-making being
diminished (Table 2). In Madrid the European Council actually hig-
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Table 2 Criteria for membership
Description Element for evaluation
1. Amsterdam criteria*
Geographic European state
Political Respect for liberty, democracy, human rights, rule of law
2. Copenhagen criteria
Political 
achieve stability of insti-
tutions that guarantee the
rule of law
– description of various institutions (parliament, executive,
judiciary)
– examination of way in which individual rights and free-
doms are exercised in practice
Economic
existence of market eco-
nomy
development of capacity
to cope with competitive
pressure and market for-
ces within the Union 
prices and trade are liberalised
– significant barriers to market entry (establishment of
new firms) and exit (bankruptcies, liquidations) are ab-
sent 
– enforceable legal system, including property rights, is in
place 
– achieved macroeconomic stability including adequate
price stability, sustainable public finance and external
accounts
– broad consensus about the essentials of economic policy
– sufficiently well developed financial sector to channel
savings towards productive investment 
adaptability of enterprises 
– existence of functioning market economy with sufficient
degree of macroeconomic stability for economic agents
to make decisions in a climate of stability and predicta-
bility 
– sufficient amount, at an appropriate cost, of human and
physical capital, including infrastructure, education and
research and future development in this field 
– the extent to which government policy and legislation in-
fluences competitiveness (trade policy, competition po-
licy, state aid, support for SMEs)
– degree and pace of trade integration a country achieves
with the with the EU before enlargement (volume and
nature of goods already traded with Member States) 
– proportion of SMEs, partly because SMEs tend to bene-
fit more from improved market access, and partly becau-
se a dominance of large firms could indicate a greater re-
luctance to adjust (European Commission, 1997)
Legal
adopt the acquis
– screening – harmonisation of national legislation with
the acquis
hlighted the importance of the implementation of regulations and the
role of institutions, while no additions to the criteria for membership
were made. This can be seen in the method of monitoring the progress
of the candidates, the European Commission tracking this according to
the Copenhagen criteria. No explicit element for evaluating a candida-
te’s harmonisation with Madrid exists, while the assessment of institu-
tional progress is based on the degree of success with which the Copen-
hagen criteria are met. This is the result of the fact that a considerable
part of the law of the Community consists of directives and that the EU
respects the principle of subsidiarity. A directive is binding, as to the re-
sult to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed,
but leaves to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.
At the same time, the principle of subsidiarity is the principle whereby
the Union does not take action (except in the areas which fall within its
exclusive competence) unless it is more effective than action taken at
national, regional or local level. It is closely bound up with the princi-
ples of proportionality and necessity, which require that any action by
the Union should not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objec-
tives of the Treaty. For this reason, at the EU level harmonisation of in-
stitutions is limited in a small number of areas, and candidates are ex-
pected to fulfil the conditions, themselves selecting the necessary mea-
sures and the manner of achieving them. The EU gives explicit recom-
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Adherence to the aims of
objectives of economic,
political and monetary
union
– defined during negotiations
Ability of EU to take in
new members
– implementation of EU institutional reforms making po-
ssible the functioning of an enlarged EU
– adoption of a budget for enlargement
– adoption and implementation of reforms of given poli-
cies (agricultural, structural)
3. Madrid Criteria
Institutional
Effective application of
legislation through appro-
priate administrative and
judicial structure
– specific demands on institutions are made if adju-
stments in terms of Copenhagen are ineffective
* Amsterdam criteria are those contained in the founding treaties; they were supplemen-
ted through the Amsterdam revision, but I quote them under these names (not as criteria
from the founding treaty) for the sake of consistency, because they are so referred to in
official documents in Croatia.
mendations about the organisation of given bodies of the public admi-
nistration in candidates in the advanced phase of progress monitoring,
when it gets to know in greater detail the state of affairs in each of the
candidates. These recommendations are based on an analysis of speci-
fic problems of the given state or institution. Thus the institutional de-
mands that the EU made on candidates in the beginning of the negotia-
tions process were general – such as consolidation of democracy and
strengthening public administration. With the development of the inte-
gration process, these demands were formulated more openly, and for
example, the Accession Partnership with Estonia in 2001 identified the
need to increase the number of staff in the statistical department of the
audit office.
Membership criteria are also contained in the conditions for the
institutional relations between the EU and states that are not included in
the enlargement process. In the development of relations with third coun-
tries, the EU applies the principle of conditionality, attaching particular
importance to the political conditions. Delays in meeting these hold up
further progress in the commercial and institutional links with the EU.
The political criterion for the progress of these relations is the
same for each country: establishment of the rule of law, i.e., stability of
those institutions that guarantee the enforcement of the law. Various le-
vels of meeting this requirement are reflected in the diversity of levels
of relations with the EU. For countries included in the stabilisation and
association process, including Croatia, there is explicit mention of the
obligation to respect peace agreements, cooperation with the ICTY and
the return of refugees. However, this is not, like the conclusions of the
Madrid European Council, adding a criterion for membership, rather in-
terpreting existing criteria on an individual basis. 
Depending on the level of the fulfilment of criteria for a condi-
tional approach to states in the stabilisation and association process, six
levels of fulfilment of the conditions for membership (Table 3) can be
identified. The first condition is necessary for the approval of unilateral
trade preferences. The second is necessary for the establishment of in-
stitutional relations. The third, for candidate status, implies the achie-
vement of a higher level of fulfilment of political criteria for member-
ship than for the establishment of institutional relations. The progress
of negotiations and accession are conditional upon further progress in
harmonisation with the standards and practice of the EU.
Hence, to be included into the structures of the EU it is essential
to achieve an adequate level of harmonisation with political conditions,
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while speed of subsequent economic integration depends on progress
towards the meeting of the economic and legal conditions for member-
ship.
Table 3 Conditional approach of the European Union to the candidates and
the states of the Western Balkans
Candidates Western Balkans
Candidate status Trade preferences
Start of negotiations Institutional relation
Progress of negotiations Candidate status
Invitation to join Opening of negotiations
Progress of negotiations
Joining the EU
Economic integration into the EU is one of the aims of the SAP.
Hence, successful harmonisation with EU acquis in the area of the sin-
gle market should enable the gradual inclusion of Croatia into the struc-
tures of the EU. A precondition for progress in this process is meeting
the political criteria. Respect for the obligations of the peace agree-
ments, return of refugees and other political criteria do not directly af-
fect the fulfilment of the economic conditions for membership. Still,
these criteria indicate the credibility of institutions in general. On the
other hand, failure to respect obligations assumed puts a brake on the
development of relations and thus restricts the potential to make use of
the positive effects of integration into the EU.
The Implementation Plan for the SAA identifies the Govern-
ment, the MFA and the government bodies as responsible for fulfilment
of the Copenhagen and Amsterdam criteria and conditions.iii Hence, in
the process of integration into the EU, the public administration bodies
have a crucial role.
ELEMENTS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF
THE CAPACITY OF THE PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
In line with the Copenhagen criteria, elements for the evaluation
of success in fulfilling the political, economic and legal criteria and in
accepting the policies of the EU are evaluated. 
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We identified the elements for an assessment of the success of
the public administration on the basis of the Reports on the progress
towards accession by each of the candidate countries, Accession Part-
nerships, Action Plans for strengthening administrative and judicial
structures and analysis of projects financed by PHARE. According to
these documents, we identified elements common to all candidates in
the integration process, and the individual political elements on which
progress in the integration process depends (Table 4).
Table 4 Sources for comparison of the state of affairs in Croatia, the candida-
tes and the European Union
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EU Candidates Croatia
– Reports of the Euro-
pean Commission on
implementation of EU
policies:
– State Aid Scoreboard
– 2002 Rewievs of the
Internal Market Stra-
tegy
– Internal Market Sco-
reboard
– Internal Market In-
fringements
– Progress Reports
– Accession partnership
– Action plan for admi-
nistrative and judicial
capacity
– PHARE projects
– European Commi-
ssion Report on im-
plementation of the
SAP
– Implementation plan
for the SAA
– National programme
for the integration of
Croatia into the EU
– Plan of harmonisation
of legislation 
– Projects financed via
CARDS
Political criteria
In line with the conditionality principle in the development of
relations with the EU, belatedness in respecting political criteria was
the main reason why candidates of the Helsinki groupiv started negotia-
tions about membership two years later than the Luxembourg groupv
and why Turkey has had candidate status since 1997vi but is not nego-
tiating about membership. The political problems that hold up the pro-
gress of each state are individual. For this reason we shall put the ele-
ments for the assessment of the extent to which political criteria are met
into two groups: common and individual elements.
Each country has to meet common elements for the sake of pro-
gress of relations with the EU. Meeting these elements is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for progress in relations. When the common
elements are met, the conditions have been created for the establish-
ment of an efficient public administration. These include:
• the establishment of a legal framework relating to the civil service;
• the separation of political from administrative functions;
• provision of ongoing training for civil servants, senior and junior (for
which, however, the establishment of a national education program-
me is necessary);
• definition of public access to information;
• strengthening of financial control;
• development of the fight against corruption.
The EU identifies the individual elements for each country as a
separate entity, according to the problems specific to that country.
Economic criteria
The tasks of the public administration for the sake of fulfilling
the first economic criterion, that is the development of the market eco-
nomy (Table 2), are as follows:
• making it possible to register new companies in a simple way;
• compliance with bankruptcy legislation;
• effective property rights, which implies development of real estate re-
gisters and cadastres and an effective judiciary;
• consensus on the direction of economic policy.
The tasks of the public administration with respect to meeting
the second economic criterion for membership, i.e., development of the
ability to cope with competitive pressures and market forces, primarily
involve efficient implementation of policies that have been adopted
(trade policy, competition policy, state aid, support to SMEs). For this
the following are required:
• strengthening of the financial sector;
• reform of the public finance management system;
• strengthening of the customs and tax administrations (e.g., for imple-
mentation of measures of trade policy, including agreements on free
trade, efficient recovery of tax);
• harmonisation and surveillance of the system of state aid;
175
• harmonisation of the competition policy with EU rules and their en-
forcement, which also implies the establishment and strengthening of
economic regulators; and
• reduction of the level of the grey economy.
Legal adjustments
For fulfilment of the political criteria it is essential to respect the
fundamental principles of the Community. This further entails the esta-
blishment of a legal framework capable of guaranteeing democracy, the
respect for human and minority rights and equality between men and
women.
For fulfilment of economic criteria, the development of the ca-
pacity to participate in the single market is necessary, and the key legal
adjustments in this area are connected with adjustments to the single
market. Hence, legal adjustments are a precondition for the fulfilment
of the political and economic conditions for membership. For Croatia
the legal adjustment priorities are laid down in the SAA. They include
the areas listed earlier: respect for the fundamental principles of the
Community and adjustment to the single market. Adjustment to the sin-
gle market assumes approximation of legislation in 11 areas,vii inclu-
ding:
• competition (including matters related to state monopolies and secto-
ral regulators, company law, control of mergers and liberalisation of
transport) and state aid;
• industrial, intellectual and commercial property;
• public procurement; and
• legislation regarding technology, including standardisation, metro-
logy, accreditation and conformity assessment (Mayhew, 2003).
Harmonisation of a legal system with the EU Commission
analyses the extent to which the necessary legislative measures have
been taken to enable implementation of the acquis and what remains to
be done in this regard. The Commission also assesses whether admini-
strative structures required to implement the acquis have been establi-
shed. 
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Adherence to the aims of economic, political
and monetary union
The readiness of candidates to take on the objectives of econo-
mic, political and monetary union is assessed in the course of the acce-
ssion negotiations. The issues concerning public administration are
mainly dealt with in negotiating Chapter 30, Institutions, and Chapter
31, other matters. In this paper, these matters are covered in the part
dealing with the ability of institutions to accept the new acquis.
HARMONISATION OF THE PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION IN CROATIA WITH
THE CONDITIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP
Progress of relations with the EU, i.e. economic integration into
the EU is conditional upon fulfilment of the political membership cri-
teria. For this reason we shall first of all determine the level to which
the political elements are met, for these are, according to the experien-
ce of the candidates, crucial for progress in the integration process.
However, as can be seen from the elements previously identified for the
analysis of the fulfilment of the political, economic and legal conditions
for membership, they overlap. For example, the fight against corruption
requires that the legal framework for the public administration (e.g., the
manner of recruitment) is defined, the information that is accessible to
the public is identified, the level of the grey economy is reduced and
that the judiciary is effective. Similarly, strengthening financial control
includes the strengthening of the financial sector and the implementa-
tion of the requisite legal adjustments. For this reason in the sequel the
division into legal and economic elements is retained only for the sake
of the easier tracking of the elements identified. In substance, however,
an evaluation of the political elements necessary takes in the economic
elements, and to the extent in which this is necessary for understanding
it also includes legal elements as well as the objectives of accepting the
policy of the Community. Such an approach is prompted by the fact that
the legal system makes possible the implementation of the policies de-
fined, and the level at which the economic conditions for membership
can be met depends on the success of its implementation. In the conc-
lusion (Table 8), according to the analysis carried out in accordance
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with the elements, we determine the level of success of the public ad-
ministration vis-à-vis the meeting of the conditions for membership.
Since it is the European Commission that evaluates the readi-
ness of candidates for accession, wherever possible we have used Com-
mission data (Table 3) for the identification of the situation in and the
progress of Croatia.
Alongside these, according to an analysis of the specific featu-
res of Croatia, and through a comparison of the other states of the we-
stern Balkans that are subject to the stabilisation and association pro-
cess, we have identified other elements that might affect the success of
the adjustment process.
Political criteria
Establishment of the legal framework for the public administra-
tion. The legal framework for the public administration has been esta-
blished in all the candidates. In Croatia, these matters are governed by
the Government Officials and Employees Law (NN 30/01) and the
Obligations and Rights of Government Officials Law (NN 101/97,
135/98, 105/99, 25/00, 73/00, 30/01, 59/01, 114/01 and 153/02).viii
Separation of political and administrative functions. Advance in
this area is uneven in the candidates. In some, but not in all, candidates
a code of conduct has been established, and there are clear distinctions
between political and administrative functions. In Croatia, politically
appointed officials (government officials) are clearly distinguished
from career civil servants (government employees) by the two laws
mentioned above. At the EU level clear rules for work in institutions
were defined after the report about the frauds, bad management and ne-
potism in the European Commission in 1999 (Code of Conduct for
Commissioners, Code of Conduct for Co-operation of Commissioners
and the Departments with which they are Charged, Procedural Regula-
tions, Regulations for International Co-operation, Principles of Esta-
blishment of Groups of Commissioners, Rules of Promotion, more in
IMO, 2001-2003, No. 45).
Personnel training. In all of the candidates, personnel training pro-
grammes have been established. In Croatia the Government has identified
raising the level of the knowledge and capacity of personnel as one of the
preconditions for success in joining the EU, and has asked all bodies of the
administration to analyse their personnel and professional readiness for
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the process of integration. The analysis was carried out in March 2001, but
the training programme has still not been made (MEI, 2003). Since the of-
ficial target date for the necessary adjustments for EU membership is the
end of 2006, more than two years to work out a training programme is cer-
tainly too long. In terms of this element, Croatia lags behind the candida-
tes. In Bulgaria, for example, the training programme was set up and the
Commission in its report of 2001 found that progress had been made in
training, particularly of personnel for the supervision of public finances,
but that judges had to be trained about Community law.
In addition, the training of public servants is an element that can
be used for an analysis of the second economic criterion for member-
ship, i.e., the capacity to cope with competitive pressure within the
Union. Fulfilment of this criterion is evaluated according to the existen-
ce, in a sufficient amount and at appropriate costs, of human capital,
including education and future development. Thus 30% of the assistan-
ce from PHARE in the pre-accession period has been directed towards
institution building. Projects related to the strengthening of administra-
tive structures are carried out within the framework of the CARDS pro-
gramme. CARDS 2001 co-finances the Reform of the public admini-
stration project, which was inaugurated in November 2002. This pro-
ject includes the analysis of the necessary programmes for training and
rewards systems in the public administration. Projects related to the
strengthening of the administrative structures are also envisaged under
CARDS 2002. These projects are scheduled to start in the second half
of 2003, and to be finalised in 2004 and 2005. Priorities and activities
of the CARDS 2002 programme are comparable with the priorities of
the accession partnerships (Table 5)
Table 5 Priorities in the candidates and the countries of the Western Balkans
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Countries of the
Western Balkans
The candidates
Priorities identified Democratic stabilisation
Economic and social
development
Justice and home affairs
Strengthening administrative
capacity
Protection of environment
and natural resources
Economic policy
Economic reform
Strengthening admi-
nistrative capacity
Single market
Financial and technical
assistance CARDS PHARE
However, although CARDS, just like PHARE, does make possi-
ble the co-financing of necessary reforms, a difficulty is found in the
capacity to absorb such assistance. For the implementation of program-
mes and use of assistance there has to be an adequate level of institu-
tional capacity in drawing up the project proposal, defining terms of re-
ference for its implementation, reporting on implementation and so on.
The experience of candidates shows that in the initial years of the im-
plementation of PHARE a problem lay in thinking up, proposing and
monitoring projects. In Poland, for example, more than half of the
PHARE resources were unused because of the inability of institutions
to create and propose projects. The same thing is going on in Croatia,
in which the elaboration of an EU cooperation strategy in the area of
technical assistance was about one year late (instead of in December
2001, as planned, it was completed in December 2002). Budget reba-
lancing in 2003 redirected resources of the Ministry of Justice, Public
administration and local self-government to other purposes, because the
projects for which the resources had been provided were not launched.
And here it is very indicative that it is the Ministry that is actually in
charge of the public administration reform project implementation.
For the institution building, it is important that, in addition to ci-
vil servants, the decision-makers too are acquainted with the features of
the integration process. In Croatia, the MEI is charged with preparing
the decision makers for the role that they have in the integration pro-
cess, through a communication strategy. On the other hand, though, be-
cause of the desire for quick legal adjustments, the Parliament’s Stan-
ding Orders (NN 117/01) enable a law that is being adjusted to the
acquis to be passed in the “urgent procedure”. This means that first and
second readings are combined: in the same reading, amendments have
to be both discussed and decided on. This procedure is not limited to
priority SAA areas. According to the Government’s Standing Orders
(NN 107/00), all laws that the Government proposes have to be adju-
sted with EU acquis. Hence the Government can seek the urgent proce-
dure for every single law that it proposes. Since in this procedure the
ability to analyse the proposed amendments and/or their adjustment
with EU regulations is limited, these provisions enable, in practice, the
very reverse of what is desired to be achieved. At the same time, limi-
ting debate makes the understanding of the integration process and the
demands that it makes more difficult at all levels – from the decision
makers to the general public that follows their work. The urgent proce-
dure in addition enables a perception that in the framework of the “Eu-
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ropean laws” some laws are passed that are not necessary for integra-
tion process but for the attainment of “ordinary” political objectives.
Definition of information accessible to the public. The public
nature of the work of institutions at the EU level was set up in the be-
ginning of the 1990s, in line with the conclusions of the Edinburgh Eu-
ropean Council, since the Official Journal of the European Communi-
ties has been publishing results of the voting in the Council and infor-
mation whose publication is not obligatory. The legal framework has
been created in all the candidates to create access to information, whi-
le in Croatia the application of the Access to Information Law has still
to start. At the same time, the openness of institutions is used as instru-
ment in the fight against corruption and organised crime. Since 1999,
i.e., since the resignation of the Santer Commission,ix increasing atten-
tion at the EU level has been devoted to the openness of EU institutions.
Openness, alongside the definition of a code of conduct, the strengthe-
ning of financial control and the establishment of the new European
Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) has become an important tool in the suppre-
ssion of irregularities within the EU.
Strengthening financial control. In common to the candidates is
that reform of the financial sector and the public finance system is the
greatest of the difficulties in the pre-accession period. The Government
Officials and Employees Law and the Obligations and Rights of Go-
vernment Officials Law have set up a stringent and unified wages regi-
me as part of an endeavour to limit the costs and to enable financial
control. Still, the financing of public administration is not transparent.
This is the result of a weak system for the allocation of budgetary reso-
urces, which right up to 2001 was based on an allocation of budgetary
resources in terms of institution, and not according to an economic cla-
ssification or according programmes of work clearly set out in advan-
ce. Because of the lack of any clearly determined programmes of the
work of the public administration it was thus impossible to work out in-
dicators or to track the quality and performance of its work. For this
reason reform of the budgetary system of 2001, and the orientation to a
budget according to programmes, creates a good basis for the quantifi-
cation and performance measurement of the way the activities of the
public administration are carried out.
At the EU level, since 1999, budgetary reform has been under
way. In 2004, for the first time, the budget will be based exclusively in
terms of activities. The main objective of drawing up a budget in this
way is the distribution of resources in line with political objectives that
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have been defined in advance. For this reason the determination of prio-
rities, planning, drawing up the budget, monitoring and reporting go on
within every activity.
Fight against corruption. At the EU level, since the 1999 re-
form, a special anti-fraud office was established (OLAF). Its partners in
EU countries are customs or tax administration/offices, and in the can-
didates, the police, finance ministries and/or their offices (e.g. budget
office, customs administration). In Croatia corresponding measures are
being taken for the fight against corruption and organised crime, and in-
ternational standards are gradually being accepted. The criminal law
convention of the Council of Europe concerning corruption was ratified
in 2000 (NN Treaties 11/00), and the civil law convention in 2003 (NN
Treaties 6/03). Since 2001 Croatia has been included in the implemen-
tation of the Initiative against organised crime in South-East Europe
within the context of the Stability Pact. In 2002 the Programme for the
Suppression of Corruption and the Law on the Office for the Suppre-
ssion of Corruption and Organised Crime (known as USKOK) were
adopted. These measures enabled a more effective fight against corrup-
tion. Harmonisation of Croatian standards with international conven-
tions, and their enforcement, beefing up the capacity for prevention, in-
vestigation and prosecution, and the fight against corruption have been
identified as priority areas in the Croatian fight against organised crime
(www.fco.gov.uk/files/kfile.Croatia.pdf). In spite of this, the perception
of corruption (defined as abuse of public power for private benefit), ac-
cording to the index used by Transparency International, is greater in
Croatia than in EU member states, and is comparable with the situation
in Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovakia.
Individual elements
To illustrate kind of difficulties that can hamper the further de-
velopment of relations with the EU, less advanced candidates have
been chosen as examples. 
Romania. Inadequate childcare institutions. The 1999 regular re-
port urged the government to provide sufficient financial provision and
reaffirmed the principle that institutionalised children’s access to de-
cent living conditions and basic health care is a human rights issue. 
Turkey. Inadequate respect for human and minority rights and
lack of civil control of the army. Human rights infringements are pro-
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nounced in the jails, and there is the problem of the protection of the
rights of Kurds. For this reason the EU demanded improved conditions
in prisons, and in the reports of the Commission explicit reference was
made to the problem of the execution of the death sentence meted out
to Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan.
Croatia. The basic hurdles to progress are the cooperation with
the Hague (the Gotovina case), the return of refugees, and their pro-
perty. The level to which Croatia meets the political criteria, particu-
larly those related to the ICTY, defined by the Council of the EU in
1997, will be crucial for the acceptance of its candidature (Prodi, 2003).
Economic criteria
Registration procedure. In the candidates, removal of barriers to
market entry (establishment of new firms) has reached a satisfactory
degree of effectiveness and legal security. To make market entry easier
in Croatia, the SAA Implementation Plan looks to a revision of the Co-
urt Register Act and the formulation of Rules on the manner of making
entries in the court register by the end of 2004.
Table 6 Starting a business; Institutional indicators
Duration (days) Number of Cost (in USD)
administrative procedures
Croatia 50 13 843
Austria 29 9 1,534
Belgium 56 7 2,633
Czech Republic 88 10 648
Slovenia 61 10 1,518
Slovakia 98 10 401
Source: World Bank (2003:2)
As the details in Table 6 show, the process of starting up a firm in
Croatia includes a large number of administrative procedures. In spite of
this, the duration and cost are not greater than in the accession countries.
Bankruptcies. In most of the candidates, there have been advan-
ces in the bankruptcy procedure, and the Commission marks them as
satisfactory. In Croatia, however, the Commission thinks advance in
this area is limited because of the inadequate protection of property
rights (more detail below).
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Table 7 Closing a business; Bankruptcy variables 
Actual time  Cost Efficient outcome Court power 
(in years) (% of estate) achieved * Index**
Croatia 3.1 18 50 67
Austria 1.3 18 71 33
Belgium 0.9 4 93 67
Czech Republic 9.2 38 22 0
Slovenia 3.7 18 41 67
Slovakia 4.5 18 71 67
* The index is in a range of 1-100, 100 showing perfect efficiency (Finland, Norway and
Singapore have 99), 0 means that the insolvency system does not function.
** The index is an average of three indicators: whether the court appoints and replaces
the insolvency administrator, whether the reports of the administrator are accessible only
to court and not creditors, and whether the court decides on the adoption of the rehabi-
litation plan. Higher values indicate more court involvement in the insolvency process,
which is associated with more time and higher cost to go through insolvency, as well as
less likelihood of achieving the efficient outcome. 
Source: World Bank (2003:2)
The data in Table 7 show that the bankruptcy procedure is lon-
ger in Croatia than in the EU, while in terms of the indicators shown,
Croatia does not lag behind the candidates in the success of the ban-
kruptcy procedure.
Regulation of property rights. In the candidates, property laws ha-
ve been set up. The development of the cadastre is a common problem for
the candidates. In Croatia, the main challenge in this area is the establish-
ment of a viable legal system, but the reform of the judiciary and the land
registers is behind the deadlines envisaged. For example, the adoption of
Rules on transition from manual to electronic processing of land registers,
which is quite essential for modernisation, is more than a year late.
The implementation of the project for putting in order the cada-
stres and the land registers should provide for better protection of pro-
perty rights and contractual relations, and at the same time make it ea-
sier for the courts to be effective, and to manage bankruptcies. At the
same time, implementation of the project should help in the reduction
of backlogs in the settling of land register items in the municipal courts.
With this the real property registration and cadastre project has a direct
impact on the effectiveness of the public administration. In addition,
augmentation of the security of property rights will create conditions
for the development of the private sector and indirectly make entry in-
to the market easier (World Bank, 2002). The scope and importance of
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the cadastre and land register reform are illustrated by the fact that the
project is envisaged as lasting 15 years. For the first five years of the
implementation of the project, the World Bank has earmarked a loan of
26 million euros.
Consensus about the essentials of economic policy. This element
holds back the progress of Croatia in the meeting of economic condi-
tions for membership. The Government of the Republic of Croatia has
established a special office to coordinate matters of making a strategy
(Table 1), and 14 strategies have been accepted by the Parliament in the
framework of the Croatia in the 21st Century Project. An UNDP study
(UNDP, 2002) showed that in Croatia, since independence, more than
100 strategies have been created. Yet these strategies are only multi-
plied, never applied. The same thing has happened with the reform of
the public administration strategy. This strategy had been developed in
the framework of the Croatia in the 21st Century Project and has been
published on the Government’s official web site (www.hrvatska21.hr),
but not accepted. In the accession countries, acceptance of the objecti-
ves of economic and monetary union during the negotiations led to the
definition of the direction of economic policy. Thus consensus about
integration with the EU lays the assumptions for the consensus on the
essentials of economic policy.
Implementation of accepted principles. As previously identified,
in Croatia, although strategies are quick to be made, the implementa-
tion of them is not efficient. There are no instructions for the implemen-
tation of accepted strategies, and they themselves do not define with
sufficient clarity who should make them and in what periods of time. A
transparent manner for monitoring progress has been set up in the can-
didates, and this was particularly the case in the pre-accession period.
Level of grey economy. The level of the grey economy has a di-
rect effect on the implementation of market laws. When the undergro-
und economy makes up a large proportion of GDP this is an indicator
of ineffective market mechanisms and inefficiency of the public admi-
nistration in the implementation of its (particularly fiscal) functions
(Bajec, 2001).x The Croatian Bureau of Statistics has published estima-
tes according to which in 1998 the grey economy reached 11.3% of of-
ficial GDP, and in 1999 10.3% (DZS, 2002). An analysis of differing
indicators carried out by Johnson and Kaufmann (2001) shows that in
most cases the evaluation of the level of the grey economy is based,
among other things, on the estimate of the level of corruption.xi Accor-
ding to empirical results (Johnson, Kaufmann and Ziodo-Lobaton,
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1998) the level of the unofficial economy is strongly correlated with the
corruption perception index (CPI) used by Transparency International
(r=0.76). Since the CPI for Croatia has been in constant decline since
1999, we can conclude that the level of the grey economy is dropping
too. The results of the project Underground Economy in Croatia 1990-
2000 (IJF, 2002) point in the same direction.
Although comparison of the level of the grey economy among
countries is very unreliable, according to a frequently quoted estimate
(Schneider, 2003), in 2000-2001, the size of the grey economy in Croa-
tia, of 32.4% of GDP is comparable with that of Bulgaria (36.4%) and
Romania (33.4%), greater than in the accession countries (e.g., Hun-
gary, 24.4%)xii and members of the EU (e.g., Denmark, 17.9%, France
15%, the greatest share being in Greece, 28.5%), but still smaller than
in other countries in the West Balkans (e.g., FYR Macedonia 45.1%). 
Strengthening customs and tax administrations. The strengthe-
ning of customs administrations is essential for the sake of the imple-
mentation of the trade policy in which Croatia has made considerable
advances. Progress is manifested by inclusion in regional, bilateral and
multilateral organisations and through trade liberalisation. All the can-
didates have concluded a customs cooperation agreement with the EU.
Croatia is still at the beginning of this process. The strengthening of cu-
stoms and tax administrations is essential for the sake of the successful
implementation of formal liberalisation, the reduction of the grey eco-
nomy and so on. The EU helps the development of customs, tax admi-
nistrations and police in the candidates through twinning projects.xiii
The first such project in Croatia has already been launched. However,
the weakness of the customs administration and police can also be seen
in failure to meet the political criteria (the Gotovina case).
Harmonisation of the state aid system with the EU and surveil-
lance of their provision. State aid in Croatia is high (5.25% GDP as
against 1.01% in the EU) and sector-oriented (transport, shipbuilding,
tourism), while horizontal aid (meant for correction of market failure
and meant for all firms, such as research and development, environment
protection) is three times as little as in the EU (Kesner-Škreb, Pleše and
Mikiæ, 2003). During the gradual integration into the EU state aid has to
be reduced and the principles for its provision will have to be harmoni-
sed with principles in the EU. In the SAA implementation plan the esta-
blishment of a new and independent State Aid Agency for the surveil-
lance of aid was anticipated by December 2001. In the State Aid Law
(NN 47/03) this assignment was allotted to the Agency for the Protec-
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tion of Market Competition. Thus, during the implementation, which
was more than a year later than the deadlines laid down, the institutional
structure previously determined was modified. The change in the basic
institutional framework as against that previously planned shows that
the proposal was not well prepared, or that political interests prevailed.
Both possible reasons show the proposal of regulations without a clear
image of how they will be used to achieve the aims, i.e., they show the
weakness of the public administration.xiv In addition, since the passing
of the Law, no department has been set up in the Agency to establish a
state aid register. In all the candidates, bodies charged with monitoring
state aid are established. They are parts of ministries (Estonia, Bulgaria),
agency for the protection of market competition (Lithuania, Poland), or
are set up as special bodies (Hungary, Latvia, Slovakia). In the EU, the
register of aid has been since 2001 publicly available via the Internet
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/register), and decisions
of whether a given item of state aid is in key with the rules of the single
market is made by the European Commission.
Harmonisation of competition policy with EU rules and esta-
blishment of economic regulators. In the area of the application of the
rules of market competition, a key role is played by the development of
market institutions. The institutional precondition for the establishment
of a market economy and the achievement of economic growth is the
establishment of a market structure and the existence of government in-
tervention only in the case of market failure, i.e., government failure in
redistribution (Srinavasan, 1999). The task of market institutions is to
supervise the liberalisation of the market and to follow the implemen-
tation of regulations; they include bodies for the protection of competi-
tion and sectoral regulators (finance, telecommunications, energy).
Such institutions in the EU member states and in the candidates are or-
ganised as special departments in ministries or as independent bodies.
In the EU member states, market institutions started being founded
mainly in the 1980s and 1990s; the establishment of independent bodies
helped in the strengthening of legal certainty by the limitation of oppor-
tunities for political interventionism (OECD, 2003). The independence
of market institutions from politics is crucial to attract investors in sec-
tors that were recently liberalised and privatised (transport, energy, and
telecommunications) in countries with a developed market economy,
and investment in general in the transitional countries. However, inde-
pendent institutions are not necessarily credible in states with an ineffi-
cient legal system. This may be improved by setting out explicit objec-
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tives and requirements for reporting to Parliament and government,
such as procedural requirements and substantive judicial review (op.
cit). In transitional countries, market institutions also facilitate privati-
sation, which is usually linked with effectiveness. However, “privati-
sing in the absence of a sufficient, market-supporting institutional inf-
rastructure was a serious mistake that could and did lead more to asset
stripping than wealth creation.” (Stiglitz, 1999).
In Croatia basic market institutions have been set up: the
Agency for the Protection of Market Competition, the Telecommunica-
tions Council and the Radio and Television Council, the Croatian
Energy Regulatory Council. In the area of financial services, some of
the regulatory functions are carried out by the Croatian National Bank,
and some special bodies have been set up, such as the Directorate for
the Supervision of Insurance Companies, the Securities Commission.
Pensions reform spurred the foundation of the Central Register of Insu-
red Persons, known as REGOS, and the Agency for Supervision of Pen-
sions Funds and Insurance Companies (HAGENA) (Table 1).
Bodies with comparable authorities were set up in the candida-
tes and in the EU members, and the differences are in the organisation
(for example, the Slovene Office for the Protection of Competition is
an agency of a ministry, while in most countries these are independent
regulators or civil service bodies) and manner of financing (from the
Budget or from the fees they can charge). In areas that have been re-
cently liberalised (telecommunications, energy) the harmonisation of
the accession states with the acquis is in some cases greater than in EU
members. It would seem that harmonisation with the recent acquis is
more effective in the accession countries, primarily because of the
conditionality laid down. Thus all the accession countries have ener-
gy-regulating bodies, but Germany does not (see OECD, 2003 for mo-
re details).
Most of the market institutions in Croatia are formally indepen-
dent, but the government controls their work by the acceptance of an-
nual reports on their work and through acceptance of their financial
plans and financial reports. However, in the procedure for approving fi-
nancial reports the Government applies principles that are used in the
ministries, and thus affects the priorities and activities, as well as the ef-
ficiency, of these bodies, not to mention the overall assessment of mee-
ting membership criteria. That is, in an assessment of the capacity of a
candidate to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within
the EU, an important role is played by the degree to which government
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policy and legislation have an impact on competitiveness through trade
policy, competition policy and aid (Table 2). Thus the influence of the
Government on market institutions might considerably limit the ability
of Croatia to meet the conditions for membership. 
POINTS OF VULNERABILITY IN THE
CROATIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
In the process of integration into the EU a key role is played by
the respect for the obligations from the conditional approach and the
SAA. In the first Stabilisation and Association Report the European
Commission said that “adequate law enforcement remains one of the
major problems. There is a worrying tendency to fail to implement not
only politically sensitive court decisions but also more generally. The
challenge is to develop an efficient mechanism to ensure implementa-
tion of decisions.” (European Commission, 2002a)
The second report underlines the progress, but the Commission
says that “Croatia needs to pay special attention to strengthening its pu-
blic administration with a view to ensuring that the relevant ministries
and other public authorities are in position properly to implement the
numerous legislative reforms to which Croatia has committed itself.”
(European Commission 2003b).
In terms of size, the Croatian civil service should be big enough
for the implementation of the planned measures. An illustrative fact is
that Austria has 11 ministries, Czech Republic 13, Slovenia 14, Poland
15 and Croatia 19 (Table 1). At the EU level there are 24 directorates
general, which functionally correspond to ministries. That means that
in Croatia we have a large number of ministries, and in addition,
between 1991 and 2002 the number of units of local and regional go-
vernment rose from 104 to 560. In Croatia the general government bill
comes to 11.1% of GDP. Expenditure for general public services came
to 2.9% of GDP in 2002. Thus the fact that a public administration, on
whose pay over 11% of GDP is spent, is not capable of putting through
the necessary reforms, shows that in Croatia the administration is ma-
ssive and expensive.
By the SAA Croatia obliged itself to carry out the adjustment
necessary for associate membership during the transition period of six
years. The deadlines set forth in the SAA are mainly at the end of the
transition period. This should ensure that at the initial phase the appro-
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priate preparations are taken, among which one of the key ones is the
modernisation of the public administration with the objective of ma-
king it more effective.
However, the Implementation Plan for the SAA concentrates the
main part of the measures foreseen in the first years of the implemen-
tation. Authorities responsible to carry out these measures are the same
bodies of the public administration that themselves need reforming. At
the same time, the National Plan for the Integration of the Republic of
Croatia into the European Union supplements Implementation Plan for
the SAA with measures necessary for adjustment to the whole EU sy-
stem during the six-year period. This kind of approach reflects the in-
tention of filling all the criteria for EU membership by the end of 2006.
However, the delays identified in the second regular semi-annual report
in the key areas of reform – of the judiciary, of state aid and the public
administration reform (Vlada RH, 2002a) all threaten the process of in-
tegration into the EU. That is, the fulfilment of all Amsterdam and Co-
penhagen criteria is coordinated by the Government, while it is the bo-
dies of the public administration that are charged with the implementa-
tion of them. Since for a successful integration process an efficient pu-
blic administration is required, the delay in the implementation of its re-
form (modernisation and increase of effectiveness) threatens the inte-
gration.
The National Plan identifies the need to qualify the existing and
the founding of new, independent and competent bodies, and to make
sure that they can work (through provision of premises, financing and
equipment). It says that for this purpose it is necessary to have “a con-
siderable increase of the number of employees as against the existing
situation, and to give them basic and specialist training”. And yet no
mention is made of any reduction of workers in the existing public ad-
ministration. Reform of the budget, so that it is directed towards pro-
grammes and results in the mid-term period, should be a good founda-
tion for stabilisation, and even reduction, of the growth of employment
in the administration.
Effectiveness and its connection with the financing of given in-
stitutions is an important element in the modernisation of the public ad-
ministration. The documents of the Government published to date do
not provide for the introduction of performance criteria in the public ad-
ministration, do not systematically identify which bodies should be
reorganised and how, and who should monitor the implementation of
new regulations. MEI is charged with the coordination of the making of
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regulations and tracks them up to the moment they are sent to Parlia-
ment. After that, the procedure is not monitored, and it can happen that
the ministries charged with the implementation do not make the nece-
ssary detailed regulations and instructions, and such failures are never
penalised. In the formally independent institutions, through an applica-
tion of the control mechanism of approving the financial plan, the Go-
vernment directly affects the effectiveness and action priorities of the-
se bodies. In a Conclusion of April 2003, the Government obligated the
regulatory bodies (Agency for Protection of Market Competition, Secu-
rities Commission, Insurance Companies Control Directorate, Tele-
communications Council, and the Croatian Energy Regulatory Council)
to draw up their financial plans based on the same principles that are
valid in the ministries (according to the costs method, without any
built-in methods for monitoring effectiveness). Further, the government
limited the amount of funds for each individual item of the financial
plan per employee at the level of the ministries, so that it should not be
greater than those in the ministry that has the greatest expenditure per
employee for the same item. Linking this amount with the greatest
amount per employee creates an incentive for the hiring of a large num-
ber of poorly trained and badly paid administrative and auxiliary per-
sonnel and/or an irrational raising of costs up to the items that exist in
the ministries.
In the same Conclusion the Government obliged the regulatory
bodies to pay the difference between revenue and expenditure into the
national Budget. Thus the government redefined the regulatory bodies
that are not financed from the budget, making them not non-profit but
profit-making bodies, the profits of which go to the owner (the state).
Although the approach that assumes supervision of the Government
over the financial plans and reports is justified because of the inefficient
legal system and the accountability for possible abuse, on the other
hand the lack of effectiveness of the Government restricts the work in
these bodies too. Finally, according to the Government Law (Article 30
Paragraph 3), the Government should not give individual instruction to
independent bodies. By breaking this rule (as in example for drawing
up a budget) legal certainty, already shaken by frequent changes of
laws, is additionally reduced. 
For example, the Telecommunications Council was set up in
2001 by the Telecommunications Act Amendments Law (NN 68/01).
During the procedure of the selection of commissioners, the term of of-
fice was reduced from five to two years (NN 109/01), and the first pe-
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riod will be over at the end of 2003. In the meantime, a new law has
been passed, and the Council will actually cease to exist, these affairs
being taken over by the Croatian Telecommunications Agency. The
new Telecommunications Law was adopted during the process of the
privatisation of Croatian Television Channel 3, and the best tender was
chosen by the members of the Radio and Television Council. This Co-
uncil will also soon become defunct and its authorities too will be taken
over by the Croatian Telecommunications Agency.
Next, reviews of regulations about regulatory bodies and market
institutions do away with the ability of independent experts to take part
in their work, because all the functions are “professionalised”, that is,
all experts have to be engaged full-time (the Protection of Market Com-
petition Law regulates the function of the members for the Council for
the Protection of Market Competition, and the Telecommunications
Law regulates the functions in the Croatian Telecommunications
Agency). Full time work is not in itself bad and in theory allows indi-
viduals to commit themselves to the full. Still, according to OECD re-
search, in small countries with limited resources, it is harder to ensure
the effective work of independent and professional regulators (OECD,
2003). In addition, bearing in mind the condition in the public admini-
stration, the intentions of the Government to equalise the wages with
the wages of civil servants and to make the budgets in these bodies as
in the ministries, not to encourage professional development and trai-
ning, such provisions might lead to a reduction of the professional le-
vel of these bodies. 
Finally, through change in the institutional framework, changes
in the practice of implementation become feasible, and a space is ope-
ned for speculation about whether changes in the law are linked with
personnel changes, whether they are a form of political pressure and/or
if the new legal framework that provides for the professionalisation of
the performance of these duties is a way of increasing the subservience
of these independent regulators to political pressures. 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since the country became independent, the only serious reform
of the public administration in Croatia has been its expansion. The large
number of ministries has led to the fragmentation of action and makes
coordination more difficult. The result is weak effectiveness and lack of
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trust in the public administration. At the same time, frequent changes in
the laws that govern the work of bodies with public authorities increase
the instability of institutions charged with the enforcement of the laws.
The Government has recognised that an effective public admini-
stration is crucial for the implementation of regulations after they have
been adopted. However, in the implementation of reform, difficulties
have shown up. First, the strategy for the development of the public ad-
ministration has not been defined. From this derives the on-going need
for adjustments, which leads to legal uncertainty. This in turn reduces
the credibility of the institutions and strengthens the need to supervise
them, which exceeds the Government’s capacity. Secondly, effective-
ness is not monitored, financial control is poor, and the budget is based
on costs. Difficulties in these areas are experienced by the accession co-
untries, individual EU members and institutions at the level of the EU.
The differences are in the level of these problems, i.e., to what measu-
re they limit the success of performing the tasks of the public admini-
stration. In accordance with the overall assessment of the European
Commission, in line with the conditional approach, Croatia is compa-
rable with the Helsinki Group as they were just before the beginning of
negotiations in 1999. The main obstacle to further integration into the
EU is the weakness of the institutions charged with the effective colla-
boration with the ICTY and with the implementation of other obliga-
tions from the peace agreements, i.e., the individual elements for the
judgement of harmonisation with political criteria (Table 8).
According to the elements for the assessment of the public ad-
ministration during the fulfilment of the economic conditions for mem-
bership, Croatia lags behind the candidates and the member states pri-
marily in the implementation of measures necessary for adjustment to
the single market (e.g., institutions charged with the monitoring of the
giving of state aid). A comparison of the priorities of PHARE and
CARDS shows that the problems Croatia is facing are comparable with
those of the candidates during the adjustment period. The later start of
harmonisation explains the lower level achieved to date.
Reform of the public administration should enable to create the
conditions for effective implementation of reforms in other areas, too.
This would increase the effectiveness of the public administration, al-
low deadlines to be met and increase credibility of the government.xv
Experience of the accession states and of technical and financial assi-
stance might speed up this process. Meanwhile, a key role in the pro-
cess of strengthening the public administration will be played by the
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planning and preparation of reform. To increase the effectiveness of the
public administration and its contribution to joining the EU, the fol-
lowing recommendations can be made:
• Define the objectives of public administration reform, order and dead-
lines for single measures;
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Table 8 Assessment of the success of the public administration in Croatia re-
lated to meeting conditions for membership*
I Political criteria /
a) Common elements ☺
establishment of a legal framework for public administration ☺
separation of political from administrative functions ☺
provision of on-going training for civil servants /
definition of material to which the public has access ☺!
strengthening financial control .?
development of the fight against corruption .?
b) Individual elements
respecting peace agreements ☺
cooperation with ICTY /
return of refugees .?
II Economic criteria /
a) Development of market economy /
simple registration of firms .?
effective bankruptcies .?
effective regulation of property rights /
consensus about the direction of economic policy /
b) Capacity to cope with competitive pressure
and market forces within EU /
strengthening the financial sector .?
reform of the system of public finances /
strengthening tax and customs administrations ☺!
establishing state aid rules and monitoring their implementation /
harmonising competition policy with the rules of the EU /
diminishing the size of the grey economy .?
*The public administration in Croatia is evaluated as being successful in cases when ac-
cording to the indicators considered it is comparable with the candidates invited to be-
come members of the EU.
Key:
☺ meets the conditions for membership
☺! formally does meet the conditions, implementation needs monitoring
.? a level adequate for membership has not been achieved, nevertheless some pro-
gress can be seen
/ does not meet conditions for membership
• Define and separate the authorities of the various public administra-
tion bodies and those of institutions with public authorities (clarify the
institutional framework);
• According to the objectives and assignments of the public administra-
tion and the institutions with public authorities, lay down their orga-
nisation;
• Reduce the number of ministries to make coordination easier;
• Determine performance criteria and relate institutional budgets to
them;
• Gradually introduce budgeting in terms of activities; 
• Monitoring reforms in all phases in implementation (as opposed to no
further than the legislative phase);
• For each measure, appoint just one body, and not several, to be char-
ged with the coordination;
• Reduce the engagement of the Government in managing reforms that
are not priorities for the sake of improving its effectiveness; and
• Strengthen the independence of the independent bodies and the tran-
sparency of their work.
i The courts and other institutions that have the authority to hand out sanctions are
certainly important for an effective implementation of the regulations. Still, this
paper is concentrated on the ability to carry through the regulations, not on the
effectiveness with which failures are penalised.
ii The founding treaty means the Treaty of Nice, or the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, consolidated version, with amendments agreed on at the
meeting of the European Council in Nice (European Council, 2000:1).
iii The term conditions here and elsewhere in the text, mentioned in conjunction with
membership criteria, imply the conditions from the EU's regional approach, i.e., the
obligations to respect peace agreements, work with the ICTY, and create the condi-
tions for the return of refugees.
iv This concerns Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania and Malta, who start-
ed membership negotiations after the European Council meeting in Helsinki in
December 1999. For all the countries except for Malta the reason for the later begin-
ning of the negotiations was the failure to meet political criteria. In 1996 Malta put
its application, originally submitted in 1990, on hold, but reactivated it in 1998.
v These are Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus, which
started membership negotiations in 1998, in line with the decision of the European
Council in Luxembourg, December 1997.
vi Turkey signed an association agreement in 1963. It handed in an application for
membership in 1987, but the European Commission in its first opinion concerning
Turkey’s candidacy was against starting negotiations. The Luxemburg European
Council confirmed that Turkey was a candidate, and since 1998 Turkey has been
gradually brought into programmes meant for candidates. The first accession part-
nership was accepted in March 2001.
195
vii These are: market competition and state aid, intellectual, industrial and commercial
property, public procurement, standardisation, metrology, accreditation and con-
formity assessment, consumer protection, company law, accounting law, financial
services, land transport, health and safety at work, data security.
viii The assessment of whether the public administration in Croatia enables the fulfil-
ment of these political and economic criteria is shown in Table 8.
ix All 20 members of the Commission and its president Jacques Santer resigned in
1999 immediately after the publication of an independent report concerning claims
about fraud, bad management and nepotism in the work of the Commission (see
Euroscope no. 42).
x As stated in the introduction, some of the indicators overlap. For a comparison of
the level of the grey economy, proxies are corruption and effectiveness of the cus-
toms and tax administrations indicators.
xi The research covered 9 indicators that were developed by different institutions. Six
of them were based on the level of corruption.
xii Latvia is an exception; the level of grey economy is estimated at 39.6%.
xiii Twinning programmes enable the exchange of know-how between experts in the spe-
cific area in the recipient country and the EU member country. This assistance
instrument was developed in PHARE for the development of the institutional capac-
ity of candidates in the pre-accession period, and is also applied in the framework
of the CARDS programme.
xiv This example also indicates the overlapping of indicators of public administration
performance – for example, of the implementation of accepted principles as gener-
al requirement for individual demand for adjustment to the given areas of the acquis.
xv For example, the Energy Law provided for the Ministry adopting the necessary sub-
laws in a period of 6 months, and that the operators in the energy field should obtain
their licenses for carrying out their activity. However, the Economics Ministry did
not adopt any detailed regulations, and reform was not carried out. The only effect
of the passing of this law was to increase legal uncertainty, because the laws that
were passed were never put into effect.
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